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This study investigates linear and nonlinear effects of job tenure on organizational performance 
and explores how administrators’ job tenure can moderate the relationship between three key 
managerial strategies – innovative management, participatory management, and external 
management – and performance. Using archival performance indicators available from the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in combination with a recent survey of nursing 
home administrators, we find that job tenure has a linear and nonlinear relationship with two 
different performance dimensions, respectively. Also, more experienced managers are better able 
to manage external environments and share power internally to achieve better outcomes.  
 
Introduction 
Work experience is expected to affect employees’ skills and knowledge, influence their behavior, 
and enhance individual and organizational performance. Often used as a predictor or a proxy for 
employees’ capacity, work experience plays a crucial role in decisions related to hiring, firing, 
compensation, and promotion (Dragoni et al. 2009; Dokko et al. 2009; McEnrue 1988). Prior 
theoretical and empirical research on work experience reveals its breadth and complexity, 
identifying its numerous dimensions (Tesluk & Jacobs 1998). With the significance of one of its 
many dimensions – job tenure – well established, research proceeded to explore its complex 
interactions and moderating effects with organizational context, the environment, and other 
individual characteristics. While past studies examined interactions of job tenure with numerous 
factors, research on how, specifically, managerial job tenure enhances the impact of management 
strategies on organizational performance is limited. To address this gap, our study investigates 
both linear and nonlinear effects of managers’ job tenure on organizational performance and 
explores how job tenure augments the effect of three key management strategies – innovative 
management, participatory management, and external management – on performance.  
This study examines public, for-profit and nonprofit U.S. nursing homes that receive 
federal government funds. The topic of managerial longevity has received considerable attention 
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in this field. High levels of administrative turnover, shown to be detrimental to its performance, 
characterize the nursing home industry, making it an ideal case for assessing the impact of 
managerial experience (Geletta & Sparks 2013; Lerner et al. 2014). Our theoretical framework 
on the effect of managers’ job tenure and management strategies on performance is informed by 
public administration, business management, strategic management, psychology, and the health 
care literature. In our analysis, we use a set of reliable performance indicators available from the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services performance appraisal system in combination with 
a recent survey of nursing home administrators’ managerial strategies.  
We find that managers’ job tenure has a linear and potential nonlinear relationship with 
two different dimensions of nursing home performance measures. In addition, more experienced 
managers are better able to manage external environments and share power internally to improve 
organizational outcomes. In contrast, the effect of an innovative management style on 
performance is not influenced by managers’ job tenure. By shedding light on job tenure, this 
study contributes to our understanding of the complex pathways through which good 
management can enhance organizational outcomes. 
 
Managerial Tenure and Performance 
The broader domain of temporal features of employment includes work experience;1 succession 
and turnover;2 individual age and longevity;3 career path, life-cycle and seniority;4 and other 
factors. Chief among them is work experience, encompassing life events occurring in and 
 
1 See Allen and Panian (1982), Ammons and Bosse (2005), Bedeian, Ferris and Kachar (1992), Boardman et al. 
(2010), Dokko et al. (2009), Fizel and D'Itri (1997), Marato and Rodgers (1984), McEnrue (1988), Nass (1994), Ng 
and Feldman (2009); Quinones et al. (1995); Rollag (2004), Sturman (2003), Tesluk and Jacobs (1998). 
2 See Fizel and D'Itri (1997), Haveman (1993), Hill (2005), Mondak (1995). 
3 See Allen and Panian (1982), Bedeian, Ferris and Kachar (1992), Schwoerer and May (1996), Sturman (2003).  
4 See Miller and Shamsie (2001), Thurmond (2010).  
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perceptions gained in a work setting.5 With the growing median age of U.S. workers (Toossi, 
2015), the experience of employees in executive leadership, middle management, and line staff 
positions has been studied across public and private sector settings (Allen & Panian 1982; Eitzen 
& Yetman 1972; Finkelstein & Hambrick 1990; Fizel & D'Itri 1997; Henderson et al. 2006; 
Juenke 2005; Marato & Rodgers 1984; McEnrue 1988; McNitt 2010; Miller & Shamsie 2001; 
Mondak 1995; Scully 1994; Taylor & Greve 2006; Thurmond 2010).  Theories of work 
experience have advanced from narrow early conceptualizations to the more complex, nuanced 
and multi-dimensional definitions and approaches.6 The earliest and most common7 approach to 
experience – job tenure – captures its duration within a unit or organization.8  The concept of 
tenure is relevant to all levels within organizations. Recognizing the central role that top 
executives and their actions play in organizations, our study is focused specifically on 
managerial tenure and its impact on organizational performance (Hambrick & Mason 1984; 
Hambrick, Geletkanicz & Fredrickson 1993).  
 Learning Theory (March & Simon 1994; March 2010), and Human Capital Theory 
(Becker 1975) provide insights on the relationship between these two factors. The former 
advances the idea that people learn through experience (Herriot, Levinthal, & March 1985; 
March 2010). Gaining experience is a process of making sense of one’s work (Wagner et 
al.1987). Experience generates memories that generate solutions and mechanisms – routines, 
 
5 This is adopted from the original definition from Quinones et al. (1995: 890), where “Experience is generally 
defined as events that occur in an individual’s life that are perceived by the individual.”  
6 Tesluk and Jacobs (1998) as well as Quinones, Ford, and Teachout (1995) offer more comprehensive models of 
work experience that includes the core components of amount, duration, density, timing, type, and incorporates both 
the quality and the quantity of experiences for each of the core components. 
7 Quinones, Ford, and Teachout (1995) report that 79% of studies they found employed time-based measures of 
experience.  
8 Employee or managerial job tenure, organizational or within-division tenure, tenure with a specific supervisor, 
within-the-sector tenure, and tenure at a location/site are just a few examples of constructs reflecting the duration of 
various distinct aspects of employment-related experiences (Allen & Panian 1982; Bedeian, Ferris & Kachar 1992; 
Marato & Rodgers 1984; McEnrue 1988; Nass 1994; Sturman 2003). 
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theories and behaviors – to respond to the uncertainty (March & Simon 1994; Nass 1994). 
Experience influences performance through the acquisition of knowledge and skills: by 
enhancing competency, which in turn improves individual and organizational performance 
(Dokko et al. 2009; Hambrick & Mason 1984; Nass 1994; Quinones et al. 1995). Experienced 
managers internalize the occupational norms, expectations, and policies; they learn about 
authority, who to work with, and how to build relationships (Boardman et al. 2010; Dokko et al. 
2009; Henderson et al. 2006; Miller & Shamsie 2001; Nass 1994; Sturman 2003). This 
knowledge prepares managers for problem-solving and makes them more resilient (Ng & 
Feldman 2009). Similarly, Human Capital Theory approaches work experience as on-the-job 
training that enhances productivity and leads to better compensation (Becker 1975).  
While these arguments suggest a positive relationship between experience and 
performance, some theories suggest a curvilinear relationship (Eitzen & Yetman 1972; Sturman 
2003). Studies on the stages of CEO careers find that the learning and maintenance stages are 
followed by the stages of decline and disengagement (Miller & Shamsie 2001; Hambrick & 
Fukutomi 1991; Stout, Slocum, & Cron 1988). As March and Simon (1994) note, experience is 
an imperfect teacher: its lessons can be incomplete and ambiguous. Learned routines can lead to 
rigidity and complacency which eventually undermine performance (Dokko et al. 2009; Eitzen & 
Yetman 1972; Hambrick, Geletkanicz, & Fredrickson 1993; Henderson et al. 2006; Miller & 
Shamsie 2001; Taylor, Audia, & Gupta 1996). These arguments suggest an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between tenure and performance.  
Empirical studies support these propositions. Some find a positive relationship between 
tenure and various objective indicators of individual and organizational performance (Finkelstein 
& Hambrick 1990; Marato & Rodgers 1984; McDaniel et al. 1988; McEnrue 1988; Scully 1994; 
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Taylor & Greve 2006). Studies investigating the non-linear effects find that late-tenure 
performance tends to plateau or decrease (Eitzen & Yetman 1972; Hambrick & Fukutomi 1991; 
Miller & Shamsie 2001; Tesluk & Jacobs 1998; McDaniel et al. 1988).9 
Managers do not operate in a vacuum, and the role of the organizational context and 
individual attributes and actions may change as managers gain experience (Sturman 2003; 
Hambrick & Fukutomi 1991; Nass 1994). Prior research explored how job tenure moderates the 
influence of employees’ race (Bratsberg & Terrell 1998), gender (Lynn, Cai, & Horn 1996; 
Bedeian, Ferris, & Kachar 1992), abilities (Schmidt et al. 1988), job satisfaction (Bedeian, Ferris, 
& Kachar 1992), stress levels (Hunter & Thatcher 2007), within-firm experience (Dokko et al. 
2009; Hill 2005), organizational size (Thurmond 2010), level of managerial discretion 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick 1990), industry stability (Henderson et al. 2006), job complexity 
(McDaniel et al. 1988, Sturman 2003), and past performance (Boeker 1997) on organizational 
outcomes. A notable area of limited research involves the interaction between management 
strategies and the administrators’ job tenure. This study seeks to fill this gap.  
Managerial strategies related to internal and external organizational realities are critical in 
determining organizational outcomes (Andrews, Boyne, & Walker 2006; Boyne 2003; Boyne et 
al. 2006; Brewer 2006; Meier & O’Toole 2001; Nicholson-Crotty & O’Toole 2004; O’Toole & 
Meier 2011; Selden & Sowa 2004). Organizational managers set goals, design structures, 
motivate staff, build relationships, and manage performance (Forbes, Hill, & Lynn 2006, p. 255; 
Kenis 2006; Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill 2000; Rainey & Steinbauer 1999). Work experience is likely 
to produce valuable knowledge and skills that can enhance the use of various management 
 
9 A recent study finds a positive relationship between tenure and task-relevant knowledge and skills, but once 
knowledge and skills are controlled for, the direct effect of tenure on performance in fact becomes negative (Dokko 
et al. 2009). 
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strategies by illuminating their pitfalls, their applicability to different contexts or various 
contingencies involving their use. Managers with longer tenures may be more likely to be the 
carriers of organizational cultures and develop a better understanding of and relationships with 
the internal and external organizational stakeholders (Juenke 2005). This knowledge may 
reinforce the impact of various management strategies on organizational outcomes. To conclude, 
past studies provide ample evidence of job tenure and management being critical sources of 
organizational improvement. What we do not know is how management strategies and job tenure 
interact while influencing organizational service quality and outcomes. That is the primary focus 
our study.  
Hypotheses  
The current study examines the relationship between job tenure, management and 
performance. Specifically, we investigate how job tenure moderates the relationship between 
three key managerial practices – innovative management, participatory management and external 
management – and organizational performance. Past studies provide helpful insights on these 
relationships.  
First, managers’ experience can be a prominent factor in an organization’s propensity for 
inertia and status quo rather than risk-taking and innovation (Hambrick, Geletkanicz, & 
Fredrickson 1993; Simsek 2007; Jaskyte 2011). Managers with longer tenure are likely to pursue 
less experimentation and informational diversity, and follow more consistent strategies that 
conform with the industry trends (Finkelstein & Hambrick 1990; Miller & Shamsie 2001). They 
are more likely to follow the fixed paradigms that worked in the past and lose touch with the new 
developments (Henderson et al. 2006; Boeker 1997). Managers in the earlier stages of their 
careers, on the other hand, may be more open to gaining new knowledge through new 
9 
 
experiences (Hambrick & Fukutomi 1991; Miller & Shamsie 2001). Thus, shorter tenure may 
enhance the effect of innovative management on organizational performance as new managers 
may be more open to fully embrace these innovations and lead the change (having said that, it is 
also possible that more experienced managers may use their knowledge to selectively and 
carefully apply innovation for the benefit of organizational outcomes, while the younger 
managers may seek to improve performance by simply pursuing a broader scope of innovations, 
some of which may or may not have a desired effect).  
Second, longer job tenure might augment the influence of external management strategies 
on performance. Longer job tenure results in more extensive knowledge of the external 
environment and stakeholders and may increase the managers’ propensity to take advantage of or 
to buffer external influences (Sturman 2003). Juenke (2005) finds that managers’ tenure interacts 
with networking behavior, resulting in improved outcomes. In networks, less experienced 
managers tend to suffer since networking requires understanding the network and its actors and 
developing trust (Juenke 2005). These managers are more prone to exploration and more 
concerned with ways to cope with external changes (Stout, Slocum, & Cron 1988), and thus, 
may be less effective at using networks to the organization’s advantage. 
Third, job tenure can enhance the effect of the internal relationships that administrators 
develop within organizations. While this area is less explored, job involvement does increase 
with longer job tenure (Wagner et al. 1987). This can enhance managers’ embeddedness, reliance 
on and use of organizational resources, including human capital.  
All of these arguments suggest that the impact of three management strategies – 
participatory style of management, management of external influences, and use of innovation – 
on performance may be different at various levels of job tenure.  
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 Turning to the context of this research, we study the effects of top administrators’ job 
tenure on organizational performance in U.S. nursing homes which provide room, meals and care 
for individuals with severe chronic care needs.10  Nursing home administrators are licensed 
professional managers who oversee clinical, financial, administrative, personnel and other 
aspects of nursing home operations (Geletta & Sparks 2013). Among their top priorities are 
health care quality, financial performance and regulatory compliance: all equally important for a 
facility’s wellbeing. Similar to the broader public management literature, the concept of work 
experience has received attention in the nursing home care literature providing additional 
insights on the relationships examined in this paper.11,12 Focusing on the experience of top 
nursing home administrators, numerous studies explore its effect on performance. The findings 
generally suggest that tenure is associated with better resident outcomes, such as percent of 
residents in pain or unmet standards of care, and lower odds of having severe deficiencies 
(Anderson et al. 2003; Decker & Castle 2011; Keays et al. 2009; Lerner et al. 2014). Research on 
the relationship between job tenure and management strategy is limited. Castle and Banaszak-
Holl (1997) provide empirical evidence suggesting that a nursing homes’ top management 
team’s combined tenure is positively related to innovation (computerization) adoption; however, 
two top managers with more dissimilar job tenures are also more likely to innovate. While we 
found no studies of tenure and other management strategies, in the broader healthcare context, 
 
10 Most U.S. nursing homes are for-profit (65%), while some are nonprofit (28%) and governmental (7%) 
(Amirkhanyan et al. 2008). Theories of nursing home markets suggest key differences across ownership mostly due 
to significant informational symmetries between providers, clients, and third-party payers (Davis 1993; Scanlon 
1980). 
11 In addition to the studies of job tenure and performance, reviewed above, some researchers also explore factors 
contributing to the length of employment. Singh and Schwab (1998) examine the effects of job environment related 
factors on length of employment. In another paper they suggest job history and performance outcomes are associated 
with administrator job tenure (Singh & Schwab, 2000).  
12 There are also some papers exploring other temporal aspects of employment, such as administrator turnover. 
Numerous studies have been conducted to examine the effects of administrator turnover on organizational 
performance, staff turnover, and job satisfaction (Castle 2001; Castle 2005; Castle 2007).  
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the tenure of hospital administrators has been found to be positively associated with higher levels 
of networkedness (Pfeffer & Salancik 1977). However, investigating the effect of health 
administrators’ job tenure and domain consensus in inter-organizational Health Systems 
Agencies,13 Burns (1982) finds that more experienced administrators are more skeptical about 
such external inter-organizational arrangements.14 No research, however, explores how job 
tenure influences the relationship between management and performance. To address this gap in 
the literature, this study proposes the following hypotheses:  
H1: Shorter job tenure will enhance the effect of managerial innovation on organizational 
outcomes.  
 
H2: Longer job tenure will enhance the effect of external management strategies on 
organizational outcomes.  
 
H3: Longer job tenure will enhance the effect of managerial power-sharing strategies on 





To test our hypotheses empirically, we employ three data sources: the federal Nursing Home 
Compare (NHC) dataset, the Texas A&M University’s (TAMU) Nursing Home Administrator 
(NHA) Survey (Compton et al. 2013), and the Area Health Resource Files (AHRF). The NHC is 
collected by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) provides archival measures 
of ownership, care quality, staffing, and facility characteristics. We use the NHC January 2014 
data file (which includes nursing home state inspection data conducted 9 to 15 months prior to 
January 1, 2014), and merge it with the NHA survey conducted between 2012 and 2013. The 
 
13 Health System Agencies considered in the cited article provide opportunities for health care consumers and 
participating organizations to get engaged in variety of community health planning.  
14 The negative relationship between experience and domain consensus may be specific to the context of specific 
inter-organizational arrangements considered in this study. 
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NHA surveys were sent out to all governmental nursing homes (N=903), and randomly selected 
1,000 for-profit and 1,000 nonprofit facilities. The survey was sent to nursing homes’ top 
executives – nursing home administrators. A total of 717 nursing home administrators responded 
to the survey in three waves, yielding a 25% response rate. Despite the modest response rate 
(25%), the average key characteristics of our sample, by sector, do not significantly differ from 
the population (N=15,695) or the fielded sample (N=2,906). All fifty states and the District of 
Columbia were represented in the final sample. One difference of note is that our sample 
includes slightly better performing nursing homes than the population (see appendix Table 1). 
Lastly, the AHRF data set, produced by the U.S. Bureau of Health Professionals, provides 
county-level data on demographic characteristics, socio economic status, and other health 
organizations relevant to the chronic care market (e.g. hospices, hospitals, etc.) in 2010 and 
2011. 
 
Dependent variables: nursing home quality 
We employ two measures of nursing home quality: the total number of health deficiencies and 
overall 5-star rating. The total number of health deficiencies reflects all violations assigned to a 
Medicare or Medicaid (or dually) certified nursing home in a single inspection cycle (typically, 
15 months). These violations include both the results of a standard inspection by state inspectors 
who visit nursing homes every 9 to 15 months, or a formal resident/family complaint. Though 
the health deficiency measure can theoretically range between 0 and at least 180 – that is how 
many regulations can theoretically be violated, in our sample the values range between 0 and 31 
with the mean of 5.87 and standard deviation of 5.08. The deficiency measure has been widely 
used in the health policy literature and in the public management research (e.g. O’Neill et al. 
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2003; Amirkhanyan, Meier, & O’Toole 2017; Amirkhanyan et al. 2018). Collected by a multi-
disciplinary team of independent state surveyors, who follow a standardized protocol during their 
annual unannounced inspections, health violations are regarded as a valid, reliable and 
comprehensive measure of nursing home service quality.  
Another indicator of the nursing home service quality is the overall five-star rating. Since 
2008, the CMS began calculating and making public the overall facility rating, with higher 
ratings reflecting higher quality care. The formula used to calculate the ratings incorporates (1) 
the health inspection results (accounting for health deficiencies in the three recent years with 
more weight assigned to the more recent inspections); (2) staffing per resident per day, adjusted 
for the severity of residents’ care needs; and (3) measures of quality drawn from the patients’ 
clinical data.  
 
Key independent variables: management strategies and job tenure  
The main independent variables in this study are nursing home administrators’ management 
strategies and their job tenure. We use information on three management strategies (innovative 
management, participatory management, and external management) from the NHA survey. 
Nursing home administrators were asked to answer a set of questions about their management 
strategies using a 4-point scale, from strongly disagree (coded as 1), to strongly agree (coded as 
4). First, to measure innovative management, we used three questions that ask about the nursing 
home administrators’ propensity to look for and adopt new ideas, technologies, and practices. 
The three items all loaded on a single factor between 0.86 to 0.90 with a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.81 (see appendix Table 2 for the questions and individual factor loadings). Second, 
participatory management reflects managers’ propensity to encourage other stakeholders to 
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participate in decision-making. Three survey items loaded on a single factor with coefficients 
between 0.77 and 0.84 with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.74. Third, managing external influences 
capture an administrator’s understanding and strategies on external influences. Four questions 
correlated with a single factor between 0.59 and 0.81 with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.59. In this 
paper, we use the average of survey items for each measure as a proxy for each concept.  
We measure job tenure as the number of years that a nursing home administrator has 
worked in her/his current position (source: NHA Survey).15 In our sample, the average job tenure 
of nursing home administrators is 7.16 years with a standard deviation of 7.41.  
 
Control variables 
We control for several organizational factors: organizational ownership, the number of certified 
beds, the number of residents, a total of nursing hours per resident per day, percent of residents 
on Medicaid, hospital affiliation, the change of ownership during past 12 months, the status of 
chain affiliation, and the years since initial certification.16 Ownership indicates whether a nursing 
home is public, nonprofit, or for-profit. Using for-profit nursing homes as the base category, we 
include dummies for nonprofit and public nursing homes. Second, chain affiliation is also a 
dummy variable indicating whether a nursing home is affiliated with a Continuing Care 
 
15 We also test the effects of the total number of years as a nursing home administrator instead of job tenure in the 
current position (models not shown). Yet, we find neither a linear nor nonlinear relationship with the quality of care. 
In fact, the correlation coefficients between years of experience in the current position and the total number of years 
as a nursing home administrator are 0.44, which suggests a short tenure. This suggests that experience in the current 
position is a more valid measure than administrator experiences throughout the career since it captures experience 
within a specific context (internal and external, with a given set of community partners, navigating staffing 
dilemmas and needs of their current nursing home, and knowledge of the local labor market conditions, etc.). 
16 Our control variables, except for the chain affiliation, are in 2011 since the nursing home inspection cycle is 
mostly every 9 to 15 months and it overlaps with the NHA survey period (for more details see Amirkhanyan, Meier, 
and O’Toole 2017, pp. 386-387). The chain affiliation measure is in 2013 since it is not available in 2011 and less 
likely to change from year to year. Our results hold with using all control variables in 2013 or excluding the chain 
affiliation indicator.   
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Retirement Community (yes=1; no=0). Third, the number of certified beds captures nursing 
home size. Fourth, the number of residents who occupy beds reflects the occupancy rate of the 
organization after controlling for the number of certified beds. Fifth, the measure for total 
nursing hours per resident per day captures the number of registered and vocational nurses, as 
well as the hours of the nurses’ aides per day per resident as an indicator of the facilities’ ability 
to provide care and supervision of the residents. Sixth, the percentage of residents on Medicaid 
represents the share of nursing home residents who have spent down their incomes and are 
covered by the Medicaid program. Seventh, we include a variable reflecting whether the nursing 
home is affiliated with a hospital rather than being a freestanding organization (1=affiliated with 
a hospital; 0=freestanding). Eighth, we include a binary variable indicating whether the nursing 
home experienced the change of ownership in the past 12 months (1=yes; 0=no). Lastly, years 
since the initial certification of the nursing home is a proxy for the age of the facility.  
In addition, we also include controls for environmental factors: population density 
(county population per square mile), the percent of (65+) elderly, the percent of persons in the 
county below the poverty line, and market competition. Market competition is measured by the 
Herfindahl index of market competition which ranges between 0 and 1 and is calculated using 
the sum of squared market shares (number of beds) for Medicare or Medicaid certified nursing 
homes in a county (Source: NHC). Table 1 includes summary statistics of all variables. 
 
Analytical approach 
Given the different data-generating processes of our two dependent variables (nursing home 
quality measures), we use two different modelling strategies. For health deficiencies, we use 
negative binomial regression models due to the presence of overdispersion in the “count” nature 
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of this measure. For overall five-star ratings, we use generalized ordered logit models.17 To 
account for unobserved characteristics across states, we add state fixed effects to each model. 
Lastly, in Appendix Tables 3 to 4, we test all models in Tables 2 to 3 including total number of 
health deficiencies in 2011. With or without this measure of previous total health violations, our 




Tables 2 and 3 present results on the effects of job tenure and management strategies as well as 
their interaction effect on nursing home service quality. Each table includes five models. Model 
1 is the base model testing the linear relationship between job tenure, management strategies and 
performance. Model 2 adds a squared term of job tenure to investigate the potential nonlinear 
relationship. Models 3 to 5 add interaction terms between (a) participatory management and job 
tenure, (b) innovation management and job tenure, and (c) external management and job tenure, 
respectively, to the base model.18 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In Table 2, the dependent variable is total number of health deficiencies. All models in 
Table 2 suggest that innovative management is positively related to the service quality. 
Consistent with the past research (Amirkhanyan et al. 2018), innovation-focused management is 
associated with fewer health violations in a nursing home. Model 1 in Table 2 suggests that 
managerial tenure is negatively related to the total number of health deficiencies (𝛽=-0.012; 
 
17 When running ordered logit models, the parallel regression assumption is violated. Since five-star ratings are 
clearly ordered, rather than running multinomial logit (or probit) models, we choose generalized ordered logit 
models to consider the nature of dependent variable, at the same time, alleviating the concern of the violated 
assumption. 
18 Although we do not include all three interaction terms together in one model due to severe multicollinearity, the 
interactive results remain the same when we do so.   
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p<.01). As managers gain more experience in their positions, their facilities are likely to have 
fewer violations. Model 2 tests the nonlinear relationship between job tenure and the quality of 
nursing home care. In this model, both linear and squared term of job tenure are not statistically 
significant at the conventional significance levels. To ensure the relationship is linear, we further 
examine a potential polynomial relationship between the two, adding a cubic term of job tenure 
to Model 2.19 Though the linear term in Model 1 in Appendix Table 5 is statistically significant, 
it becomes statistically insignificant once past performance is controlled in Model 2; squared, 
and cubic terms of job tenure in both models are also not statistically significant. Thus, we 
conclude that the relationship between job tenure and the total number of health deficiencies is 
likely to be linear. 
Models 3 to 5 test an interaction effect of job tenure and management on nursing home 
violations. We find that when managers have a very short tenure and encourage employees to 
participate in executive decisions, violations are more likely to occur. As managers gain more 
experience, however, this negative relationship can be moderated.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 is a graphic illustration of Model 3 in Table 2 generated through simulating 
parameters 1,000 times using Clarify (see King, Tomz, & Wittenberg 2000). We calculate 
expected values in a hypothetical public organization where its nursing home administrator has 
 
19 To ensure the relationship between job tenure and total number of health deficiencies is a linear function, we 
conduct post-hoc analyses. In doing so, we first split our sample by years of job tenure, run about thirty regression 
models, and find no consistent results. Since our sample for each regression model was small, as a next step, we 
employ regression models splitting our sample in quantiles of job tenure. The first regression model (the first 
quantile of job tenure) shows no statistically significant relationship. The second, third, and fourth models, however, 
suggest job tenure has a negative, positive, and negative impact on total number of health deficiencies, respectively. 
The set of analyses suggests a potential polynomial relationship between job tenure and performance. We also 
conduct the analyses using overall 5-star rating as the dependent variable and find the same results. The results of 
post-hoc analyses are available upon request from the corresponding author.  
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not changed during the past 12 months, holding all other variables at their mean values. In Figure 
1, the (dashed) line indicates the predictive margins of one standard deviation (below) above the 
mean value of participatory management. Figure 1 suggests that when managers involve 
stakeholders less in decision making, even if they gain more experience, the number of violations 
will not decrease substantially. However, when a manager involves stakeholders more in the 
decision-making, as she/he gains more experience, the total count of deficiencies will decrease 
from 4.47 to 1.85. Thus, a new administrator does not seem to benefit from participatory 
decision-making at the beginning of their career, potentially, due to the fact that he or she does 
not yet do a good job of incorporating the demands of stakeholders into decision making. They 
may be too quick to take bad advice or not have the experience to resolve competing demands. 
Whether these managers are ineffective early adopters of participatory style or they adopt it later 
in their careers, involving more stakeholders as the administrator gains expertise on the job 
seems to have a positive effect. In Models 4 and 5, the interactive hypotheses between 
innovation management and job tenure and between external management and job tenure are not 
significant. 
 Table 3 investigates the relationship between job tenure, management strategies, and the 
overall five-star rating. Model 1 in that table suggests that participatory and innovation 
management are positively associated with the overall five-star rating. Adding the squared term 
of job tenure to examine its potential nonlinear relationship, Model 2 still shows both linear and 
squared terms of job tenure are not statistically significant. As our post-hoc analyses suggested 
(see footnote 19), we include a cubic term of job tenure in Model 2 to test a potential polynomial 
relationship. Model 3 in Appendix Table 5 shows a polynomial relationship between the two: 
first positive (𝛽=0.150; p<.05), second negative (𝛽=-0.010; p<.05), and third positive 
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(𝛽=0.0001; p<.010). The relationship holds even after controlling for the past performance 
measure in Model 4 in Appendix Table 5, suggesting a polynomial relationship between the two, 
first positive, second negative, and then positive. 
As job tenure has a different relationship with our service quality measures shown in 
Tables 2 and 3, the relationship between management strategies and overall five-star rating also 
depicts different dynamics compared to the results in Table 2. Participatory and innovative 
management strategies do not seem to have an interactive effect with job tenure in Models 3 and 
4. Model 5, however, suggests that the effect of external management is conditioned on job 
tenure though the direct term of external management is not significant.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 Figure 2 graphically presents Model 5 from Table 2. We calculate the predicted 
probabilities of each of the overall five-star rating categories through simulating parameters for 
1,000 times. We set a nursing home organization as the one in the public sector, assuming no 
changes in the administrator position during the past 12 months, and holding all other values at 
their mean. Figure 2 suggests that when a manager is less active in external management (one 
SD below the mean), even if the job tenure increases, predicted probabilities rarely change. In 
fact, the probabilities of receiving lower evaluations (from 1 to 3 stars) slightly increase with less 
external management. For an externally active manager (one SD above the mean), if she/he has 
no experience in the organization, the manager is less likely to perform better compared to the 
less externally active one. The gap, however, disappears quickly. As the job tenure increases, for 
managers with better external management skills, the predicted probabilities for receiving the 
highest rating substantially increases from 0.52 to 0.74, while predicted probabilities of receiving 
other ratings (from 1 to 4 stars) decrease. 
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 To reflect on the findings pertaining to control variables, they are consistent with the 
large body of theoretical and empirical literature investigating the effect of legal ownership, size, 
Medicaid reimbursements, urbanicity, and other factors on quality of care in nursing homes 
(Amirkhanyan 2008; Amirkhanyan, Kim & Lambright 2008, 2009; Amirkhanyan, Meier & 
O’Toole 2017; Amirkhanyan, Meier, O’Toole, Dahwe & Janzen 2018; Amirkhanyan, Meier, 
Holt, & McCrea 2019).  Mirroring this past research, our findings suggest that nonprofit and 
pubic homes have fewer deficiencies and higher star ratings compared to for-profit nursing 
homes. Additionally, facility size (measured in number of beds) is associated with more 
violations and lower star ratings. Also, nursing home quality is negatively related to the percent 
of residents in a nursing facility who are reimbursed by the Medicaid program (as opposed to 
private long-term care insurance, Medicare, or out-of-pocket payments). Finally, lower 




This study explores the relationship between organizational performance, job tenure, and 
management strategies using data collected from a recent survey of nursing home administrators 
combined with the CMS performance assessment data. Our paper focuses on two distinct 
measures of nursing home quality: health deficiencies and star ratings. Each captures a different 
set of performance aspects, and hence, it is not surprising that management strategies interact 
differently with job tenure while influencing these two measures of performance.  
For the first measure – the total number of health deficiencies – longer tenure results in 
fewer health deficiencies. These findings align with the existing literature that suggests a positive 
relationship between experience and performance. The findings suggest that more prolonged 
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tenure as a nursing home administrator – entailing a more in-depth understanding of all the 
various components of care quality and relevant internal management strategies, as well as the 
nature of the regulatory mandates – generates ‘professional wisdom’ that better prepares 
managers to minimize the number of regulatory violations.  
Importantly, we find that the interaction effect of tenure and participatory style of 
management significantly decreases the number of deficiencies. This improvement offers a more 
nuanced explanation of the linkage between management, tenure, and performance. The 
government holds nursing homes accountable using a plethora of regulations: a complex system 
of over 180 regulatory standards that span a wide variety of technical areas (i.e. resident rights, 
clinical nursing, administration, dental, dietary, pharmacy services, etc.). The deficiencies 
identified by regulators pertain to a single inspection cycle and are not adjusted for the clinical 
case mix. State inspectors observe and record the majority of these deficiencies (as opposed to 
self-reporting by home administrators) thus imparting more integrity and independence into 
these third-party assessments. In order to comply with the vast number of regulatory 
requirements successfully, our findings suggest that nursing home administrators can’t “do it 
alone” and must rely on internal allies (staff) as well as patient/family groups in decision-
making. They need a strong team of professionals in a variety of areas who can ensure that 
service delivery meets the regulatory requirements. Building such a team and learning how to 
best delegate to its members may require time. 
 How this experience gained from tenure is used to build teams is interesting and worthy 
of consideration. The longer the administrator’s tenure within an organization, the higher the 
likelihood of personally hiring, developing a sense of expertise, and a trusting relationship with 
key leaders such as the Director of Nursing, the Medical Director, and other middle managers. In 
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cultivating these relationships and providing mentorship (leveraging their own longer-term 
experience), administrators have an opportunity to groom advocates who will champion 
regulatory compliance across a range of areas: from nursing care to residents’ rights and 
administration. This trust-based relationship typically comes with a delegation of power to the 
middle managers’ who possess subject-area expertise, which seems to have a positive effect on 
performance. The delegation of power is likely to have a stronger impact when managers have 
developed trust and shared goals with their team. Managers typically develop this type of 
advanced leadership through learning matched with experience, two processes that take time. 
New managers are less likely to know the right person to delegate to and are more likely to have 
to work with those hired by previous administrators. Experienced managers are better able to 
capitalize on power sharing within the organization than new managers are when navigating the 
very complex and diverse sets of performance outcomes and assessment tools that make up 
nursing home’s compliance with a complex regulatory system.  
 The impact of tenure on the second measure of nursing home quality – the overall five-
star rating – is similar to that of health deficiencies. To illustrate, administrator’s longevity 
enhances the effect of externally oriented management practices on the overall star rating. Based 
on the current CMS star rating formula, nursing homes may in fact influence the various 
components of their star ratings. O’Toole and Meier (2011, p. 56) note the effect of public 
managers’ interacting and engaging with external actors, as their actions result in the ability to 
“fend off potential disruptions and threats to the core organization’s operations.” Specifically, 
staffing levels are one component of the star rating that may be influenced by the administrators’ 
use of external management aimed at more effective staffing practices. These external strategies 
may involve communicating with staffing agencies to address last-minute staff shortfalls such as 
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filling vacant nursing shifts quickly. Having an established relationship with the local staffing 
agencies and knowing the best nurses available can facilitate filling positions quickly and 
avoiding a clinician gap. Thus, an experienced manager attuned to the value of external relations 
will develop and maintain a relationship with external agencies to achieve higher performance by 
influencing the staffing component of the star ratings. 
 A nursing home’s clinical case mix is another component of the star rating, and deliberate 
external strategies can help maintain the optimal case mix in the facility. Relationships with the 
Area Agency on Aging, local hospital discharge planners, assisted living facilities’ 
administrators, other nursing homes, and chronic care providers can serve that purpose. 
Experienced administrators are likely to have collaborative relationships with the case managers 
of these agencies to optimize the mix of placements (e.g., admitting more patients covered by 
Medicare), or to allow the nursing home to more effectively compete for specific clients to 
maintain a desirable case mix. These external strategies can also help maintain a healthy 
occupancy rate and can be aided by the nursing home administrator’s long tenure and 
embeddedness in the local community.  
 The so-called “Quality Measures” are another component of the star rating score, 
reflecting facility’s compliance with a set of clinical practices related to the use of restraints, 
psychotropic drugs, and others. An experienced administrator who is attuned to the external 
environment is more likely to recognize the importance of hiring top-tier Quality Management 
(QM) nursing staff. To successfully identify and hire superior candidates, though, a manager 
requires a strong working knowledge of the QM nursing network. Similarly, networking with 
various professional associations will help in obtaining the strategies to elevate the star ratings. 
Likewise, networking with government agencies and other health care providers in the 
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community can provide more information on regulatory inspections and develop trusting 
relationships that can aid in the communication of information (including self-reported data, such 
as staffing20) with government inspectors.  
 Lastly, our results indicate that job tenure has a different relationship with nursing home 
service quality measures. To illustrate, the relationship between tenure and the health 
deficiencies is linear suggesting that as tenure increases, there are no diminishing (marginal) 
returns on a nursing home’s retention of the long-term administrators, all things else being equal. 
The implication is that administrator effectiveness continues to increase with tenure, without a 
later-period fall off. This long-term improvement appears to benefit organizational performance 
with no stages of decline throughout the administrators’ career. The relationship between tenure 
and the overall five-star rating is more complex. Our findings suggest that as tenure increases, 
the rating will initially improve. After a certain point, the relationship between tenure and the 
training becomes negative (see Model 4 in Appendix Table 5); retaining a nursing home 
administrator can harm the rating. The mixed results on the relationship between tenure and 
nursing home service quality measures call for future research. We suggest future scholars to 
investigate the inverted-U shaped and polynomial relationships, even if they do not directly posit 
the relationship, so that we can accumulate scientific knowledge.  
 Overall, we find that experience enhances the use of traditional management strategies 
such as participatory management and external management, and that seasoned administrators 
provide benefits and elevate a nursing home’s performance. Interestingly, tenure may also assist 
in the development of relationships with state regulators and provide similar benefits. If the 
 
20 As of July 1st, 2016, CMS requires nursing homes to upload their staffing data directly from their payroll records 
to CMS, allowing for verification of staffing ratios by CMS staff (CMS 2017). 
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nursing home administrator and the state inspector and his/her team are both experienced, the 
learning curve of inspections and regulatory compliance is theoretically steeper. It is even 
possible that the two teams have an established professional relationship from previous 
inspections, further contributing to the development of a positive working relationship. This 
professional relationship may also include a significant element of trust earned through the 
nursing home’s successful mitigation of past deficiencies identified by the inspector. Having said 
that, while such long-term trusting relationships can facilitate some aspects of the regulatory 
process, they also have the potential to compromise the validity of the state inspection process 
and the relevant ratings, and thus, require further investigation (for more on this, see 
Amirkhanyan, Meier and O’Toole, 2017 and the literature cited therein).  
 We note several limitations of this study. First, while similar to the population of U.S. 
nursing homes in terms of their key features, sampled facilities have somewhat higher service 
quality (not fully attributable to the oversampling of government nursing homes, which typically 
perform better than for-profit homes).  Also, average job tenure in our sample is also higher than 
that in several past studies (Castle & Decker 2011; Singh & Schwab 2000; Murphy & Fridkin 
2004). Stronger performance and longer tenure may be associated with higher managerial 
expertise and effectiveness than that in the general population. More effective managers may be 
more likely to learn from their experience and apply their knowledge to their decisions while 
working on improving performance.  
 Additionally, while the longer time-frame of administrators’ tenure in our study and the 
use of lagged independent variable can help address the possibility of reverse causality (e.g., the 
possibility that substandard performance might prompt the administrators’ departure), more 
research involving longitudinal analysis that follows individuals over a longer time-span may be 
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useful to fully investigate the relationship between job tenure, management strategy and 
organizational performance. Additionally, the external generalizability of our conclusions is 
limited by the unique nature of nursing home administrators’ fairly short tenure compared to 
other fields (Castle and Decker 2011; Lerner et al. 2014; Murphy & Frinkin 2004; Singh and 
Schwab 2000). 
 Finally, while our study examines the effect of administrative strategies and tenure on 
nursing home service quality, there are other important aspects of organizational performance, 
such as financial performance, access to care, and others.  Prior research suggests that different 
aspects of performance and assessments of performance by different stakeholders may be 
determined by a different set of organizational and environmental factors (Amirkhanyan, Kim, & 
Lambright 2014). Thus, extending this study to a broader range of organizational outcomes may 
be an important step in understanding the relationship between managerial tenure, management 
and performance.  
 
Conclusion 
This study has several implications for public management scholars and practitioners. First, the 
results show that tenure enhances managerial influence, albeit over time as the term suggests. 
The concept that tenure improves performance might prove useful for the county and state 
governments charged with public nursing home oversight, nursing homes' boards of directors, 
and particularly state licensing boards. This finding also aligns with other studies in public 
management literature in the context of public education (Cheon & An 2017; Juenke 2005) and 
local property assessors (Propheter 2016). 
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 The unique contribution of this study is that job tenure can in fact augment the effect of 
managerial strategies on organizational performance. The positive link between some managerial 
strategies and organizational performance can be strengthened by longer tenure.  Yet, for 
managers with shorter tenures it may be advisable to focus on core functions and learning on the 
job. To those interested in the impact of management on performance, our study reinforces the 
importance of organizational/individual context in which various management strategies are 
implemented.  Participatory management and networked governance are concepts taught widely 
across public administration programs. Our study suggests the importance of recognizing that the 
effect of these strategies is highly dependent on who implements them and how performance is 
evaluated.  
Third, the findings from this study offer policy implications. Each state sets the 
requirements for licensing nursing home administrators in their state. Most states require nursing 
home administrator applicants to work as a trainee before being board certified. For example, 
Pennsylvania requires participation in at least 1,000 hours of an ‘administrator-in-training’ 
program, under the “…supervision of a full-time nursing home administrator licensed in this 
Commonwealth or in another state whose licensing standards are equal to those of the 
Commonwealth” prior to sitting for their state and federal licensing boards (Pennsylvania 2010). 
Determining and adjusting the optimal length of the ‘administrator-in-training’ program might 
help address some of these ramifications of shorter job tenure on performance especially in the 
areas characterized by a shortage of experienced nursing home administrators. While some 
nursing homes do offer paid ‘administrator-in-training’ programs, increasing the number of these 
programs so that they become the norm in the path to productive performance may best serve the 
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nursing homes. More importantly, though, is growing the experience of future administrators so 
that they may improve the life of the clients under their care.  
Lastly, in keeping with Juenke (2005), which illustrates the relationship between job 
tenure, managerial networking, and organizational performance, our study highlights the 
importance of job tenure in practicing managerial strategies and more importantly, its impact on  
service quality. Since managers and employees learn from their experience across all 
organizations, our findings should apply to other types of organizations regardless of sector. The 
findings of this study may be especially relevant in the field of health and human services where 
tangible performance outcomes may be harder to define and quantify. To strengthen the 
generalizability of this study, we encourage future scholars to examine these relationships in 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total number of health deficiencies 647 5.85 5.04 0 31 
Overall 5-star rating 618 3.66 1.25 1 5 
Job tenure 649 7.22 7.46 0 38 
Management: Sharing power 649 0 1 -3.22 1.20 
Management: Innovation 649 0 1 -3.07 1.95 
Management: External influences 649 0 1 -3.10 2.39 
Change of owner during past 12 months 649 0.02 0.16 0 1 
Nonprofit nursing home 649 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Public nursing home 649 0.34 0.48 0 1 
Chain affiliation 649 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Number of certified beds 649 104.08 73.74 9 720 
Number of residents 649 90.14 68.30 3 664 
Total nursing hours per resident per day 649 4.12 1.44 1.5 24.02 
Percent residents on Medicaid 649 58.41 21.95 0 100 
Hospital affiliated home 649 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Years since certification 649 21.42 11.81 0 44 
Population density 649 0.79 2.77 0 35.37 
Percent elderly 649 15.39 4.07 6.62 35.14 
Percent in poverty 649 15.52 5.23 4 41.80 
Herfindahl index of competition 649 0.29 0.29 0 1 
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Table 2: Job tenure, management strategies, and health deficiencies 
  
 Note. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01; state fixed effects included but not reported.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Job tenure -0.012** -0.016 -0.014** -0.012** -0.013**
(0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Management: Participatory 0.017 0.017 0.084+ 0.017 0.015
(0.034) (0.034) (0.045) (0.034) (0.034)
Management: Innovation -0.139** -0.138** -0.133** -0.135** -0.146**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.045) (0.034)
Management: External management -0.053 -0.053 -0.058+ -0.054 -0.015
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.046)
Job tenure squared 0.000
(0.000)
Job tenure × Participatory -0.010*
(0.004)
Job tenure × Innovation -0.001
(0.004)
Job tenure × External management -0.005
(0.004)
Control
Nonprofit nursing home -0.312** -0.312** -0.303** -0.311** -0.306**
(0.087) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087)
Public nursing home -0.335** -0.336** -0.326** -0.334** -0.332**
(0.091) (0.091) (0.090) (0.091) (0.090)
Chain affiliation 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.010 0.007
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.113)
Change of owner during past 12 months 0.053 0.049 0.042 0.050 0.038
(0.209) (0.210) (0.208) (0.210) (0.209)
Number of certified beds 0.006** 0.006** 0.005* 0.006** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of residents -0.004+ -0.004+ -0.003 -0.004+ -0.004+
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total nursing hours per resident per day -0.022 -0.022 -0.019 -0.022 -0.021
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Percent residents on Medicaid 0.003+ 0.003+ 0.003+ 0.003+ 0.003+
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Hospital affiliated home 0.005 0.006 -0.002 0.005 0.006
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Years since certification 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Population density -0.034* -0.034* -0.033* -0.034* -0.033*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Percent elderly -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Percent in poverty 0.014+ 0.014+ 0.013+ 0.014+ 0.014+
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Herfindahl index of competition 0.296* 0.296* 0.289* 0.297* 0.293*
(0.148) (0.148) (0.147) (0.148) (0.147)
Constant 1.665** 1.678** 1.637** 1.668** 1.615**
(0.414) (0.416) (0.412) (0.415) (0.416)
Alpha -0.984** -0.985** -1.001** -0.984** -0.988**
(0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.092) (0.092)
Observations 647 647 647 647 647
Likelihood ratio 211.15 211.23 216.13 211.18 212.55
p > 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 3: Job tenure, management strategies, and overall five star rating 
  
 Note. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01; state fixed effects included but not reported.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Job Tenure 0.018 0.050 0.019+ 0.019+ 0.018
(0.011) (0.031) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Management: Participatory 0.179* 0.172* 0.130 0.188* 0.189*
(0.087) (0.087) (0.116) (0.087) (0.087)
Management: Innovation 0.191* 0.180* 0.187* 0.301** 0.208*
(0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.111) (0.086)
Management: External management 0.066 0.069 0.070 0.047 -0.093
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.115)
Job tenure squared -0.001
(0.001)
Job tenure × Participatory 0.007
(0.010)
Job tenure × Innovation -0.015
(0.010)
Job tenure × External management 0.021+
(0.011)
Controls
Nonprofit nursing home 0.956** 0.968** 0.954** 0.971** 0.949**
(0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225)
Public nursing home 0.821** 0.853** 0.818** 0.837** 0.811**
(0.226) (0.228) (0.226) (0.227) (0.226)
Chain affiliation 0.162 0.160 0.160 0.120 0.175
(0.280) (0.280) (0.280) (0.282) (0.281)
Change of owner during past 12 months -0.004 0.018 -0.010 -0.023 0.087
(0.545) (0.547) (0.546) (0.549) (0.547)
Number of certified beds -0.018** -0.018** -0.018** -0.019** -0.018**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of residents 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.017** 0.016**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Total nursing hours per resident per day 0.079 0.081 0.076 0.081 0.075
(0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073)
Percent residents on Medicaid -0.015** -0.014** -0.015** -0.014** -0.015**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Hospital affiliated home -0.097 -0.111 -0.093 -0.110 -0.093
(0.286) (0.287) (0.286) (0.287) (0.286)
Years since certification 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Population density 0.122** 0.124** 0.122** 0.123** 0.121**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Percent elderly 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Percent in poverty -0.027 -0.027 -0.026 -0.028 -0.027
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Herfindahl index of competition 0.019 -0.009 0.013 0.017 0.034
(0.382) (0.383) (0.382) (0.381) (0.382)
Observations 618 618 618 618 618
Likelihood ratio 191.59 192.79 191.98 193.98 195.49

















Appendix Table 1: Comparison of All Operating US Nursing Homes to Our Sample. 
 
  
Variables For-profit Nonprofit Public For-profit Nonprofit Public
Percent residents on Medicaid (means) 63.2 49.0 62.1 62.4 50.3 62.0
Number of certified beds (means) 109.6 94.3 115.0 110.5 94.7 105.4
Number of residents (means) 89.2 81.2 95.0 91.5 83.2 90.0
Total nurse hours per resident per day (means) 3.9 4.5 4.5 3.9 4.4 4.5
Hospital affiliation (percent "affiliated") 1.1 14.5 26.2 0.9 12.4 19.6
Number of health deficiencies (means) 7.5 5.4 6.4 6.7 5.0 6.0
Overall 5-star rating (means) 3.2 3.8 3.6 3.2 4.0 3.7




Appendix Table 2:  Factor analysis of survey items 
Management: Innovation indicators Loading 
Our nursing home is always among the first to adopt new technology and practices 0.86 
We continually search for new opportunities to provide services to our community 0.8 
Our nursing home is always among the first to adopt new ideas and practices 0.9 
Eigenvalues 2.18 
Cronbach's alpha 0.81 
Management: Participatory indicators   
I involve nursing and other nonmanagerial staff in my nursing home's decisions-making process. 0.77 
Residents' and families' feedback and outcomes are taken into consideration when revising policies. 0.84 
Non-manager feedback is taken into consideration when revising policies. 0.83 
Eigenvalues 1.98 
Cronbach's alpha 0.74 
Management: External management indicators   
My role is to respond to various events and disturbances in the external environment of our nursing home. 0.59 
I always try to limit the influence of external events on the staff and nurses. 0.67 
I strive to control those factors outside the nursing home that could have an effect on my organization. 0.81 
Our nursing home emphasizes the importance of learning from the experience of others. 0.62 
Eigenvalues 1.83 




Appendix Table 3: Job tenure, management strategies, and health deficiencies controlling for 
health deficiencies in 2011. 
 
 Note. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01; state fixed effects included but not reported.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Job tenure -0.009* -0.005 -0.011* -0.009* -0.009*
(0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Management: Participatory 0.020 0.020 0.090* 0.020 0.019
(0.034) (0.034) (0.046) (0.035) (0.034)
Management: Innovation -0.117** -0.119** -0.110** -0.116** -0.120**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.045) (0.034)
Management: External management -0.069* -0.069* -0.074* -0.069* -0.046
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.046)
Job tenure squared -0.000
(0.000)
Job tenure × Participatory -0.010*
(0.004)
Job tenure × Innovation -0.000
(0.004)
Job tenure × External management -0.003
(0.004)
Controls
Nonprofit nursing home -0.276** -0.276** -0.267** -0.276** -0.273**
(0.087) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087)
Public nursing home -0.302** -0.300** -0.294** -0.302** -0.301**
(0.090) (0.090) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090)
Chain affiliation 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.063 0.060
(0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114)
Change of owner during past 12 months -0.032 -0.028 -0.040 -0.032 -0.039
(0.204) (0.204) (0.202) (0.204) (0.204)
Number of certified beds 0.005* 0.005* 0.004* 0.005* 0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of residents -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total nursing hours per resident per day 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.006
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Percent residents on Medicaid 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Hospital affiliated home 0.019 0.018 0.013 0.019 0.020
(0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Years since certification 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Population density -0.027+ -0.026+ -0.027+ -0.027+ -0.027+
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Percent elderly -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Percent in poverty 0.017* 0.017* 0.016* 0.017* 0.017*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Herfindahl index of competition 0.192 0.190 0.193 0.193 0.191
(0.150) (0.150) (0.149) (0.150) (0.150)
Total number of health deficiencies in 2011 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 0.035**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 1.158** 1.140** 1.133** 1.158** 1.134**
(0.411) (0.415) (0.409) (0.412) (0.413)
Alpha -1.067** -1.067** -1.088** -1.067** -1.069**
(0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097)
Observations 625 625 625 625 625
Likelihood ratio 241.19 241.30 246.45 241.19 241.69





Appendix Table 4: Job tenure, management strategies, and overall five-star ratings controlling 
for health deficiencies in 2011.  
 
 Note. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01; state fixed effects included but not reported.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Job tenure 0.002 0.012 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.011) (0.032) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Management: Participatory 0.179* 0.177+ 0.124 0.192* 0.188*
(0.091) (0.091) (0.122) (0.091) (0.091)
Management: Innovation 0.146+ 0.143 0.142 0.286* 0.162+
(0.088) (0.089) (0.088) (0.114) (0.089)
Management: External management 0.052 0.053 0.057 0.029 -0.088
(0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) (0.118)
Job tenure squared -0.000
(0.001)
Job tenure × Participatory 0.007
(0.011)
Job tenure × Innovation -0.019+
(0.010)
Job tenure × External management 0.018+
(0.011)
Controls
Nonprofit nursing home 0.882** 0.886** 0.881** 0.901** 0.878**
(0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232)
Public nursing home 0.791** 0.800** 0.789** 0.808** 0.781**
(0.235) (0.237) (0.235) (0.236) (0.235)
Chain affiliation -0.088 -0.088 -0.094 -0.136 -0.078
(0.291) (0.291) (0.292) (0.293) (0.291)
Change of owner during past 12 months 0.385 0.393 0.388 0.348 0.459
(0.533) (0.533) (0.534) (0.531) (0.531)
Number of certified beds -0.021** -0.021** -0.021** -0.022** -0.021**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of residents 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.021** 0.020**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Total nursing hours per resident per day -0.025 -0.024 -0.029 -0.023 -0.028
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Percent residents on Medicaid -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Hospital affiliated home -0.197 -0.200 -0.193 -0.208 -0.190
(0.303) (0.303) (0.303) (0.305) (0.303)
Years since certification 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Population density 0.094* 0.094* 0.094* 0.095* 0.093*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Percent elderly 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Percent in poverty -0.036+ -0.036+ -0.035+ -0.038+ -0.036+
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Herfindahl index of competition 0.109 0.101 0.106 0.105 0.124
(0.396) (0.397) (0.396) (0.395) (0.396)
Total number of health deficiencies in 2011 -0.205** -0.204** -0.205** -0.206** -0.204**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Constant -1.132 -1.087 -1.146 -1.235 -1.259
(1.003) (1.013) (1.006) (1.003) (1.016)
Observations 603 603 603 603 603
Likelihood ratio 320.27 320.37 320.73 323.90 323.14





Appendix Table 5: Testing a polynomial relationship between job tenure and nursing home 
service quality measures 
 
Note. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01; state fixed effects included but not reported.  
D.V.s:
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Job tenure -0.045+ -0.028 0.150* 0.111+
(0.025) (0.025) (0.065) (0.067)
Job tenure squared 0.003 0.002 -0.010* -0.009+
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Job tenure cubic -0.000 -0.000 0.000+ 0.000+
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Management: Participatory 0.013 0.017 0.187* 0.194*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.088) (0.092)
Management: Innovation -0.134** -0.116** 0.163+ 0.130
(0.035) (0.034) (0.086) (0.089)
Management: External management -0.053 -0.068* 0.065 0.049
(0.033) (0.033) (0.082) (0.084)
Controls
Nonprofit nursing home -0.312** -0.275** 0.962** 0.881**
(0.087) (0.087) (0.226) (0.232)
Public nursing home -0.335** -0.298** 0.838** 0.790**
(0.091) (0.090) (0.229) (0.237)
Chain affiliation 0.022 0.073 0.135 -0.114
(0.113) (0.114) (0.281) (0.293)
Change of owner during past 12 months 0.050 -0.028 0.047 0.409
(0.209) (0.204) (0.550) (0.534)
Number of certified beds 0.005* 0.005* -0.017** -0.020**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of residents -0.004 -0.003 0.015* 0.020**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Total nursing hours per resident per day -0.023 0.006 0.086 -0.018
(0.025) (0.025) (0.073) (0.074)
Percent residents on Medicaid 0.003+ 0.004* -0.014** -0.014**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Hospital affiliated home 0.010 0.020 -0.125 -0.211
(0.117) (0.117) (0.287) (0.303)
Years since certification 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
Population density -0.034* -0.026+ 0.126** 0.097*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.039) (0.038)
Percent elderly -0.011 -0.009 0.017 0.020
(0.010) (0.010) (0.024) (0.025)
Percent in poverty 0.015+ 0.017* -0.029 -0.039*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020)
Herfindahl index of competition 0.299* 0.194 -0.034 0.080
(0.147) (0.150) (0.383) (0.396)
Total number of health deficiencies in 2011 0.035** -0.203**
(0.007) (0.019)
Constant 1.703** 1.164** 1.213 -0.987
(0.416) (0.415) (0.968) (1.018)
Alpha -0.990** -1.070**
(0.092) (0.097)
Observations 647 625 618 603
Likelihood ratio 212.99 242.35 196.00 323.26
p > 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total number of health deficiencies Overall five star rating
𝜒2 
𝜒2 
